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On the Security of the Yi-Tan-Siew Chaotic Cipher
Shujun Li, Guanrong Chen, Fellow, IEEE and Xuanqin Mou
Abstract— This paper presents a comprehensive analysis on
the security of the Yi-Tan-Siew chaotic cipher proposed in [1].
A differential chosen-plaintext attack and a differential chosen-
ciphertext attack are suggested to break the sub-keyK, under the
assumption that the time stamp can be altered by the attacker,
which is reasonable in such attacks. Also, some security Problems
about the sub-keys α and β are clarified, from both theoretical
and experimental points of view. Further analysis shows that the
security of this cipher is independent of the use of the chaotic tent
map, once the sub-key K is removed via the proposed suggested
differential chosen-plaintext attack.
Index Terms— chaotic cryptography, tent map, differential
cryptanalysis, chosen-plaintext attack, chosen-ciphertext attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE the 1990s, chaotic cryptography has attracted moreand more attention as a promising way to design novel
ciphers, and this research has become more intensive in recent
years [2, Chap. 2]. To evaluate the security performance
of chaotic ciphers and to clarify some design principles,
cryptanalysis plays an important role.
This paper analyzes the security of the recently-proposed
Yi-Tan-Siew chaotic cipher [1] and points out some defects
existing in this cipher:
1) the sub-key K can be removed by a differential chosen-
plaintext attack and a differential chosen-ciphertext at-
tack, under the assumption that the time-stamp t can be
altered by the attacker;
2) the sub-key β should not be contained in the secret key
due to its poor contribution to the security of the cipher;
3) the noise vectors {Uj} used in the encryption/decryption
functions do not have a uniform distribution, which
downgrades the security of the cipher by limiting the
value of the sub-key α;
4) when the aforementioned differential chosen-plaintext
(or chosen-ciphertext) attack is used, the security of the
cipher is independent of the chaotic map, but depends on
the mixture of three operations from different algebraic
groups.
The first two defects mean that the claimed key (α, β, γ,K)
collapses to be (α, γ). Note that the second and third defects
were implicitly mentioned in Sec. III-B of [1] without con-
vincing explanations. This paper will give a comprehensive
analysis on all the four security defects.
This paper has been published in IEEE Transactions on Circuits and
Systems–II: Express Briefs, vol. 51, no. 12, pp. 665-669, 2004.
This research was supported by the Applied R&D Center, City University
of Hong Kong, under Grants 9410011 and 9620004.
Shujun Li and Guanrong Chen are with the Department of Electronic
Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China.
Xuanqin Mou is with the School of Electronics and Information Engineer-
ing, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710049, China.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section gives a brief introduction to the Yi-Tan-Siew chaotic
cipher. Then, the first two defects of the cipher are discussed
in Sec. III. The other two defects are analyzed in Secs. IV and
V, respectively. The last section concludes the paper.
II. YI-TAN-SIEW CHAOTIC CIPHER
This proposed cipher is a time-variant block cipher based
on the chaotic tent map. Each block has 4n bits, and the
encryption function changes as the iteration evolves. Given
a plaintext P = (P1, · · · , Pj , · · · , Pr) and the corresponding
ciphertext C = (C1 · · · , Cj , · · · , Cr), where Pj and Cj are
both 4n-bit blocks, the cipher is described as follows.
• The employed chaotic tent map is an extended version of
the normal skew tent map Fα:
G(α,β) : xi =
{
Fα(xi−1), if 0 < xi−1 < 1,
β, otherwise,
(1)
where
Fα : xi =
{
xi−1/α, 0 ≤ xi−1 ≤ α,
(1 − xi−1)/(1− α), α < xi−1 ≤ 1.
(2)
• The secret key was claimed to be a 4-tuple key
(α, β, γ,K), where γ is used to generate a secret initial
condition x0 of G(α,β) as follows:
x0 = F
4n
γ
(
10⌊log10 t⌋
t
)
. (3)
Here, t representes the current time-stamp transmitted
over a public channel. Since γ is only used to generate
x0, the secret key can also be considered as (α, β, x0,K).
Based on the secret key, the following secret functions are
calculated for the encryption/decryption procedures:
1) A sequence of 4n-bit noise vectors Uj =
(u4jn, u4jn+1, · · · , u4jn+4n−1) (j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , )
are generated from the digital chaotic orbit1 of the
extended tent map G(α,β) with the following rule:
ui =
{
0, 0 ≤ xi ≤ α,
1, α < xi ≤ 1.
(4)
2) A sequence of secret permutations wji (j =
0, 1, 2, · · · ; i = 1, · · · , n) are generated from
Uj and the sub-key K , as follows: Vj =
(vj1, vj2, · · · , vjn) = Uj ⊕ K , where each vji
corresponds to a function wji that represents a
permutation of four integers {1, 2, 3, 4} (following
Table 1 of [1]).
1In this paper, the term “digital chaotic orbit” is used to denote the orbit
of a chaotic map realized in a digital computer [2, Chap. 2.5].
23) A sequence of secret bit-permutation functions fj =
fjn ◦ · · · ◦ fj1 (j = 0, 1, 2, · · · ) are generated as
follows:
fji(X) = fji(M1,M2,M3,M4)
= [wji(M1,M2,M3,M4)]≪ 1, (5)
where X = M1× 23n+M2× 22n+M3× 2n+M4
and “≪ 1” is the 1-bit circular left-shift operation.
4) Another sequence of permutation functions f−1j =
f−1j1 ◦ · · · ◦ f
−1
jn are generated as follows:
f−1ji (X) = f
−1
ji (M1,M2,M3,M4) =
[w−1ji (M1,M2,M3,M4)]≫ 1, (6)
where f−1ji is the inverse function of fji, i.e.,
f−1ji (fji(X)) = X , and “≫ 1” is the 1-bit circular
right-shift operation.
• The initialization procedure: C0 = U0, P0 = U1.
• The encryption procedure:
Cj = fj−1 (Pj ⊕ (Cj−1 ⊞ Uj+1))⊕ (Pj−1 ⊞ Uj+1) ,
(7)
where ⊕ denotes XOR and a⊞ b := (a+ b) mod 24n.
• The decryption procedure:
Pj = f
−1
j−1 (Cj ⊕ (Pj−1 ⊞ Uj+1))⊕ (Cj−1 ⊞ Uj+1) .
(8)
III. REDUCTION OF KEY SPACE
This section discusses the reduction of the key space of the
Yi-Tan-Siew cipher, i.e., its first two security defects.
A. The Differential Chosen-Plaintext Attack for Reducing K
To break the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher via a chosen-plaintext
attack, the attacker has to make t fixed during the attack,
i.e., to make the sub-key x0 and the noise vector sequence
{Uj} fixed. This can be done by intentionally altering the
local clock of the encryption machine, which is generally
available since the attacker can access the encryption machine
in chosen-plaintext attacks [3]. If t is generated from a public
time service, the attacker can simply altering the time signal
transmitted over the public channel to alter t. In the following,
therefore, assume that t is fixed for all chosen plaintexts.
Assume {P1, · · · , Pj−1, Pj} and {P1, · · · , Pj−1, P ′j} are
two plaintexts. The difference of the ciphertexts is as follows:
∆Cj = Cj ⊕ C
′
j = fj−1 (Pj ⊕ (Cj−1 ⊞ Uj+1))
⊕ fj−1
(
P ′j ⊕ (Cj−1 ⊞ Uj+1)
)
.(9)
Assume CUj = Cj−1 ⊞ Uj+1. Then, Eq. (9) is reduced to
∆Cj = fj−1 (Pj ⊕ CUj)⊕ fj−1
(
P ′j ⊕ CUj
)
. (10)
Now, consider such a question: what can one observe from
∆Cj , if Pj and P ′j have only one different bit? Assume that
Pj =
(
p4jn, · · · , p4jn+i, · · · , p4jn+(4n−1)
)
,
P ′j =
(
p4jn, · · · , p4jn+i, · · · , p4jn+(4n−1)
)
,
and CUj = (cu0, · · · , cu4n−1). It is obvious that Pj ⊕ CUj
and P ′j ⊕ CUj also have only one different bit at the same
position i. Thus, further assuming that
Pj ⊕ CUj = (p
′
4jn, · · · , p
′
4jn+i, · · · , p
′
4jn+(4n−1)),
P ′j ⊕ CUj = (p
′
4jn, · · · , p
′
4jn+i, · · · , p
′
4jn+(4n−1)),
one has
∆Cj = fj−1(p
′
4jn, · · · , p
′
4jn+i, · · · , p
′
4jn+(4n−1))
⊕ fj−1(p
′
4jn, · · · , p
′
4jn+i, · · · , p
′
4jn+(4n−1)).
Considering fj−1 is a bit-permutation function, one
has fj−1 (Pj ⊕ CUj) = (p′4jn+I0 , · · · , p
′
4jn+Il
=
p′4jn+i, · · · , p
′
4jn+I4n−1
), and fj−1
(
P ′j ⊕ CUj
)
=
(p′4jn+I0 , · · · , p
′
4jn+Il
= p′4jn+i, · · · , p
′
4jn+I4n−1
), where
I0 ∼ I4n−1 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 4n − 1} denote the permuted
positions of the 4n bits p′4jn ∼ p′4jn+(4n−1). As a result,
∆Cj = (
4n−l︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, 1,
l−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0) = 2l−1, (11)
which means that the i-th bit of ∆P = Pj ⊕ P ′j is permuted
to the l-th bit of ∆C = Cj ⊕ C′j by fj−1.
From the above discussion, one can immediately conclude
that given the following (4n+1) plaintexts containing j plain-
blocks, the secret bit-permutation function fj−1 can be exactly
reconstructed:
P (∗) = (P ∗, · · · , P ∗, P ∗),
P (1) = (P ∗, · · · , P ∗, P1),
· · ·
P (l) = (P ∗, · · · , P ∗, Pl),
· · ·
P (4n) = (P ∗, · · · , P ∗, P4n),
where P ∗ ⊕ Pl = 2l−1. To get all r secret permutation
functions f0 ∼ fr−1 for the decryption of ciphertexts whose
sizes are not larger than r, the number of required plaintexts
is (4n+ 1)× r.
Since the sub-key K is used only to determine {fj}
(together with Uj), the reconstruction of f0 ∼ fr−1 means
the reduction of K from the whole secret key (α, β, γ,K).
Note that it is generally difficult to derive Vj from fj , due to
the strong mixing of vji and the bit-shifting operations. That
is, it is generally difficult to derive K from fj , even when Uj
is known to the attacker.
B. The Differential Chosen-Ciphertext Attack for Reducing K
Due to the similarity of the encryption and decryption
procedures, the above differential chosen-plaintext attack can
be easily generalized to a differential chosen-ciphertext attack.
Here, the attacker can make x0 fixed during the attack by
altering t transmitted over the public channel, which is pos-
sible since generally the attacker has a full control of the
public channel. In the differential chosen-ciphertext attack,
one can replace the (4n + 1) × r chosen plaintexts in the
above differential chosen-plaintext attack with (4n + 1) × r
3chosen ciphertexts. As a result, one can get all r inverses
permutation functions, f−10 ∼ f
−1
r−1, which is equivalent to
the r permutation functions, f0 ∼ fr−1.
C. Reduction of β
In Sec. III-B of [1], it was said that “most likely, β does
not act in the encryption and decryption processes”, without
any explanation. Here, we will theoretically verify this claim.
In the extended tent map Gα,β , β will have to make
influence on the cipher only after x = 0 or 1. However,
the possibility that x = 0 or 1 is so tiny that the impact of
β on the encryption/decryption procedures is computationally
negligible from the Probabilistic point of view.
Without loss of generality, assume that the map Gα,β is
realized in n-bit computing precision and that the digital
chaotic orbit distributes uniformly in the discretized space,
which is reasonable due to the uniform invariant density
function of the skew tent map [4]. So, the Probability that
x = 0 or 1 is p = 2/2n = 1/2n−1. As a result, from the
mathematical expectation of the geometric distribution [5], the
average position of the first occurrence of the above event
(x = 0 or 1) is 1/p = 2n−1.
For single-precision floating-point arithmetic, n = 30 (two
sign bits are excluded), averagely 229 = 512M iterations
are needed to activate the influence of β on the encryp-
tion/decryption procedures. This means averagely 229/8 =
64M leading bytes of the ciphertext can be successfully
decrypted without any knowledge of β. Similarly, when the
double-precision floating-point arithmetic (n = 62) is used, the
condition will become much worse: averagely 261/8 = 2GG
leading cipher-bytes can be decrypted without knowing β.
Therefore, in most (if not all) cases, β is not meaningful
in the key. In fact, it is just a trivial parameter (not part of
the secret key) to avoid the digital chaotic orbit of the normal
skew tent map Fα to fall into the fixed point x = 0.
As a summary, under the above differential chosen-plaintext
attack, the original key (α, β, γ,K) collapses to be (α, γ).
When the differential chosen-plaintext attack is impossible,
the original key (α, β, γ,K) collapses to be (α, γ,K).
IV. NON-UNIFORMITY OF NOISE VECTOR Uj
In the encryption procedure of the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher, the
noise vector Uj+1 is used to mask the plaintext Pj together
with the previous plaintext Pj−1 and the previous cipher-
text Cj−1. To enhance the potential capability of resisting
statistics-based attacks [3], it is desirable that Uj distributes
uniformly in the discrete space
{
0, · · · , 24n − 1
}
. However,
as mentioned in Sec. III-B of [1], Uj does not distributes
uniformly when α is close to 0 or 1. As a suggestion, 0.49 <
α < 0.5 was suggested in [1]. However, neither theoretical
nor experimental analysis is given in [1] to support this claim.
In this section, we investigate the theory underlying the
non-uniformity of Uj over
{
0, · · · , 24n − 1
}
. In addition, it
is pointed out that the non-uniformity of Uj is also very
significant when α = 0.5, which was not noticed in [1].
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Fig. 1. The occurrence frequency of Uj = a ∈ {0, · · · , 255}, when
(α, β, x0) = (0.1, 0.7, 0.3) (1000 samples).
A. Non-Uniformity of Uj when α 6= 0.5
In this subsection, it is shown that when α 6= 0.5, the closer
the α is to 0 or 1, the more severe the non-uniformity of Uj
will become. Strictly speaking, α 6= 0.5 can never lead to a
uniform distribution.
Similar to Sec. III-C, assume again that the digital chaotic
orbit of the map Gα,β distributes uniformly in the discretized
space. It is then easy to deduce the following two Probabilities:
Prob{ui = 0} = α,Prob{ui = 1} = 1− α. (12)
The above equations mean that Uj will contain more 0-
bits than 1-bits when α > 0.5, and more 1-bits than 0-
bits when α < 0.5. That is, Uj does not have a uni-
form distribution over
{
0, · · · , 24n − 1
}
if α 6= 0.5. When
(α, β, x0) = (0.1, 0.7, 0.3) and n = 2, for example, under
double-precision floating-point arithmetic, Figure 1 gives an
experimental curve of the occurrence frequency of Uj with
different values between 0 and 24n − 1 = 28 − 1 = 255. It
can be seen that the frequency of Uj = 255 = (11111111)2
is close to 0.5 but many others are almost 0.
Under the assumption that all bits in Uj are independent
each other, ∀a ∈ {0, · · · , 24n − 1}, one can theoretically de-
duce the Probability of Uj = a: Prob{Uj = a} = αN0(a)(1−
α)4n−N0(a), where N0(a) ∈ {0, · · · , 4n} denotes the number
of 0-bits in a. In total there are (4n + 1) different values in
all 24n Probabilities: Prob(0) = α4n, Prob(1) = α4n(1−α),
· · · , Prob(i) = α4n−i(1− α)i, · · · , Prob(4n) = (1− α)4n.
The non-uniformity of each Uj is useful for an attacker
to get its value more quickly via a specially-designed guess
order. Since the secret bit-permutation functions {fj−1} can be
reconstructed under chosen-plaintext attack (recall Sec. III-A),
the attacker can successfully decrypt any ciphertext once {Uj}
are obtained. That is, ({Uj}, {fj}) can be considered as an
equivalent of the original secret key (α, β, γ,K).
To find the right value of each Uj , the following guess order
of Uj = a is suggested: ∀a ∈ A0∪A4n, · · · , ∀a ∈ Ai∪A4n−i,
· · · , ∀a ∈ A2n, where Ai (i = 0 ∼ 2n) denotes the set of all
4Com(α) =
∑2n−1
i=0
(
Prob(i) ·
(
H(i) +
∑(4ni )
m=0
m
)
+ Prob(4n− i) ·
(
H(i) +
(
4n
i
)
+
∑( 4n4n−i)
m=0
m
))
+ Prob(2n) ·
(
H(2n) +
∑(4n2n)
m=0
m
)
=
∑2n−1
i=0
(
(Prob(i) + Prob(4n− i)) ·
(
H(i) +
(
4n
i
) ((
4n
i
)
+ 1
)
2
)
+ Prob(4n− i) ·
(
4n
i
))
(13)
+ Prob(2n) ·
(
H(2n) +
(
4n
2n
) ((
4n
2n
)
+ 1
)
2
)
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Fig. 2. log2(Com(α)) vs. α ∈ {0.01, · · · , 0.01 × i, · · · , 0.99}.
4n-bit binary integers that contain i 0-bits. With such a guess
order, the average number of searched integers (i.e., the guess
complexity) Com(α) can be calculated with Eq. (13), where
H(i) denotes the number of previous searched integers:
H(i) =
i−1∑
l=0
(
4n
l
)
+
i−1∑
l=0
(
4n
4n− l
)
= 2
i−1∑
l=0
(
4n
l
)
. (14)
When n = 16, for instance, the relationship between the
calculated complexity and the value of α is shown in Fig.
2. Note that there exist calculation errors2 that make each
log2(Com(α)) a little less than the real value, but this fact
does not influence the following qualitative analysis. From
the experimental data given in Fig. 2, one can see that the
complexity is much less than 24n−1 = 263 (the complexity of
the brute-force guess of a uniformly-distributed 4n-bit integer)
when α is close to 0 or 1. Apparently, the closer the α is to 0
or 1, the weaker the sub-key α will be. As a result, to ensure
the security of the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher, the sub-key α has to be
constrained in [α0, 1 − α0] ⊂ (0, 1), where Com(α0) should
be cryptographically large. This, however, will further reduce
the key space to some extent.
In [1], 0.49 < α < 0.5 is suggested to avoid this security
defect. In this case, 1-bit will always occur with a higher
2The errors are natural results of the unavoidable accumulation of the
intermediate quantization errors.
Probability than 0-bit, since Prob{ui = 1} = 1 − α >
Prob{ui = 0} = α. So, one can guess the value of each
Uj with a different order: A0 → · · · → A4n. Although
Prob{ui = 1}−Prob{ui = 0} = 1−2α ∈ (0, 0.02) is not so
much, the guess complexity will still be less than the simple
brute-force search. From such a point of view, 0.49 < α < 0.5
should be replaced by its balanced version: |α− 0.5| < 0.01.
B. Non-Uniformity of Uj when α = 0.5
From the discussion given above, α = 0.5 seems to be
the best parameter to generate uniformly distributed {Uj}
that should maximize the value of Com(α). Unfortunately,
according to our previous studies on the digital dynamics of
piecewise-linear chaotic maps (PWLCM) realized in fixed-
point arithmetic [2, Chap. 3], α = 0.5 is the worst parameter
from the viewpoint of dynamical degradation occurring in the
discretized space, which destroys the uniform distribution of
the generated pseudo-random numbers.
Actually, as a special case of the digital PWLCM, the
digital chaotic orbit of G0.5,β can be theoretically analyzed,
which is similar to but a little more complex than the orbit
of F0.5. Without loss of generality, assume that the least
significant bit of x0 is the nx0-th bit after the dot, i.e.,
x0 = (0.a1a2 · · · anx0 )2, where anx0 = 1. To facilitate the
following discussion, nx0 is called the binary precision of x0.
Substituting α = 0.5 into the equation of F0.5, one can get
F0.5 : xi =
{
2 · xi−1, 0 ≤ xi−1 ≤ 0.5,
2 · (1− xi−1), 0.5 < xi−1 ≤ 1.
(15)
It is obvious that F0.5(x0) must be in the form of
(0.a′1a
′
2 · · ·a
′
nx0−1
0)2, where a′nx0−1 = 1. This means that the
binary precision of x0 is decreased by 1 after one iteration.
Thus, the digital chaotic orbit of F0.5 will always trend to the
same fixed point x = 0 after nx0 iterations.
For G0.5,β , the introduction of β makes things a little
complicated: assuming that the binary precision of β is nβ ,
the orbit of G0.5,β will be in the following form:
x0
nx0 iterations−−−−−−−−−−→ 0→ β nβ iterations−−−−−−−−−→ 0→ β · · ·
0→ β
nβ iterations
−−−−−−−−−→ 0→ β · · ·
That is, the digital chaotic orbit of G0.5,β enters a periodic
cycle determined by β after a transient stage determined by
x0. The period of the final cycle is nβ + 1.
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Fig. 3. The digital chaotic orbit of G0.5,0.4 when x0 = 0.123.
As an example, when x0 = 0.123, the digital chaotic orbit
of G0.5,0.4 is shown in Fig. 3. Apparently, such a degraded
chaotic orbit will generate badly non-uniform {Uj}. When
n = 2, experiments show that the frequency of Uj = 170
is about 0.993, which means that the non-uniformity is even
worse than the one given in Fig. 1. One more example is also
tested by changing the value of α in Fig. 1 from 0.1 to 0.5 (but
the values of β and x0 are kept unchanged), and it is found
that the distribution of Uj has two prominent peaks at Uj = 85
and 170 (the frequencies are 0.412 and 0.418), respectively.
The above analysis shows that α = 0.5 is also a rather
bad parameter for the generation of {Uj} toward a uniform
distribution. So, 0.5 should be excluded from the range of α.
For example, the range |α − 0.5| < 0.01 should be replaced
by 0 < |α− 0.5| < 0.01.
C. How to Mend This Defect?
Since the non-uniformity of {Uj} is mainly caused by the
fact that Prob{ui = 0} 6= Prob{ui = 1}, it is easy to mend
it by changing Eq. (4) to the following one:
ui =
{
0, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 0.5,
1, 0.5 < xi ≤ 1.
(16)
It has been pointed out that dynamical degradation of G0.5,β
in the digital domain will influence the uniformity of {Uj}.
In fact, this Problem also exists for any α 6= 0.5, which has
been clarified in [2, Sec. 2.5.1]. Following previous studies, the
average length of all digital orbit of the tent map is O(2L/2),
when L is the bit number of the employed finite-precision
arithmetic. For double-finite floating-point arithmetic, L = 62,
so the average length is about 231, which is not sufficiently
large from the cryptographical point of view. To overcome
this Problem and also the non-uniformity caused by the
digital dynamical degradation, a small pseudo-random signal
is suggested to be used to perturb the digital chaotic orbit
timely, as discussed in Secs. 2.5.2 and 3.4.1 of [2].
V. INCAPABILITY OF CHAOS FOR SECURITY
In Sec. IV-A above, it was mentioned that ({Uj}, {fj}) is
an equivalent of the original key. By studying the possibility
of solving for {Uj} from chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs, it
can be shown that the security of the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher is
independent of the use of the chaotic map Gα,β .
Given a plaintext Pj and the corresponding ciphertext Cj ,
one can get Eq. (7) for Uj+1. Under the condition that fj−1
has been reconstructed, it is possible to solve for Uj+1 with a
number of such equations. Apparently, the solvability of Uj+1
is independent of the chaotic map Gα,β . That is, the security of
the cipher is independent of Gα,β . In fact, one can replace the
chaotic map with any other PRNG to generate Uj , without
influencing the security of the cipher. Therefore, from this
point of view, the Yi-Tan-Siew cipher cannot be considered as
a typical chaotic cipher.
Next, the solvability of Eq. (7) is discussed. Basically,
the mixture of three different operations, XOR, modulo 24n
addition, and fj−1, makes it rather difficult to get Uj+1 from
Eq. (7). Rewrite Eq. (7) as follows:
Cj ⊕ (Pj−1 ⊞ Uj+1) = fj−1 (Pj ⊕ (Cj−1 ⊞ Uj+1)) , (17)
which can be simplified as
a⊕ (b ⊞ x) = fj−1(c⊕ (d⊞ x)). (18)
The task is to find a 4n-bit integer solution of x from a
number of such equations. Considering that fj−1 contains n
circular left-shift operations, it should have at least 2n separate
branches. This implies that at least 2n points of intersection
between the graph of a⊕ (b⊞x) and that of fj−1(c⊕ (d⊞x))
have to be checked to find the only right integer solution of
x. That is, a lower bound of the complexity is O(2n).
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the security of the recently-proposed
Yi-Tan-Siew chaotic cipher [1]. Some defects of this cipher
have been pointed out and analyzed in detail. The security
analyses given in this paper should provide some useful
references for better design of various chaotic ciphers in the
future.
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